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India’s Multi-Domain Deterrence And Defence-Industrial Strategy Challenges

Context
  • The article analyses India’s need to strengthen deterrence against China by reforming its defence-industrial base, doctrinal choices, and enabling military capabilities.
  • Source: The key to India’s multi-domain deterrence, capabilities, The Hindu

Hard choices in defence strategy

  • Strategic dilemma: India faces a widening capability gap with China and must decide what to buy, build, and prioritise amid rapidly evolving technology
  • Technology-doctrine gap: Technological change is outpacing doctrinal evolution, complicating long-term defence planning
  • Deterrence objective: India must reconceptualise doctrinal and technological choices to build credible deterrence against the PLA

Three strategic approaches

Bold approach:

  • Technological leapfrogging: Invest in entirely new war-fighting technologies
  • Risk factor: Failure could create capability gaps and weaken deterrence
  • Industrial limitation: India lacks scale and speed in production to match China
  • Potential gain: Success could reduce the capability gap

Conservative approach:

  • Integration strategy: Combine emerging technologies with existing systems
  • Focus areas: Cyber, space, and electronic warfare to digitise battlespace
  • Outcome: Improves efficiency but does not shift balance of power
  • Suitability: More relevant for short conflicts (e.g., with Pakistan)

Middle-path approach:

  • Hybrid model: Retain legacy platforms while investing in enabling layers
  • Core concept: Build capabilities gradually toward multi-domain operations (MDO)
  • Challenge: MDO is difficult to define and operationalise
  • Outcome: Leads to evolution into a syncretic multi-domain force

Concept of enabling layers in warfare

  • Command and Control (C2): Centralised coordination of military operations
  • ISR (Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance): Real-time battlefield awareness
  • Strike layer: Integration of missiles, aircraft, and drones for deep strikes
  • Close-battle layer: Tanks, artillery, and infantry for frontline combat
  • Logistics layer: Infrastructure, supply chains, and rear-area support
  • Nuclear deterrence: Compensation for conventional asymmetry with China

Systemic challenges in India’s deterrence posture

Industrial limitations:

  • Structural issue: Defence-industrial base not designed for speed and scale
  • Key gaps: Missiles, munitions, drones, ISR and C2 networks, legacy platforms
  • Requirement: Expansion through private sector participation

Procurement inefficiencies:

  • Constraint: Existing system restricts rather than enables military evolution
  • Reform need: Faster, adaptive procurement aligned with technological needs
  • Budget strategy: Increase spending with prioritisation of key deterrent capabilities

Institutional coordination:

  • Alignment need: Synchronisation of R&D, industry, doctrine, and military structure
  • Strategic clarity: National security institutions must define deterrence goals collectively
  • Political-military interface: Military must communicate costs of inaction and trade-offs

Reforms for defence-industrial strengthening

Policy reforms:

  • Administrative changes: Reduce red tape and ensure budgetary stability
  • Contractual support: Provide long-term contracts for specialised platforms
  • Private sector role: Recognise efficiency advantages over government sector

Time sensitivity:

  • Shrinking window: Delay in reforms may worsen capability gaps
  • Incremental gains: Gradual improvements can yield long-term benefits

Fixing critical enabling layers

C4ISR vulnerability:

  • Weakness: India’s C4ISR systems are underdeveloped
  • Strategic importance: “The side that can see can fight”
  • Requirement: Affordable, expendable ISR platforms in large numbers

Electronic warfare integration:

  • Capability need: Cyber, space, and electronic warfare to degrade enemy ISR
  • Layered approach: Enhance own ISR while disrupting adversary’s systems

Strike and battlefield integration:

  • Deep strike: Missiles, aircraft, and drones to disrupt enemy depth
  • Frontline combat: Coordinated use of tanks, artillery, and infantry

Logistics and sustainment:

  • Importance: Integrated logistics essential for prolonged conflict
  • Infrastructure: Supply chains and rear-area systems must be robust

Nuclear dimension:

  • Strategic role: Nuclear deterrence compensates for conventional gaps
  • Balance factor: Necessary against a nuclear adversary like China

Industrial capacity and deterrence gap

Missile inventory gap:

  • China advantage: Large missile stockpile and high production capacity
  • India’s risk: Limited surge capacity in prolonged conflict

Production imperative:

  • Policy need: Incentivise defence production through targeted investments
  • Strategic risk: Weak industrial base may embolden China in prolonged war scenarios

Doctrinal and structural considerations

Focus shift:

  • Priority change: Move beyond service-specific acquisitions to system-wide capability building
  • Enabling layers: Central to effective deterrence

Theatre-isation limitation:

  • Structural reform: Theatre commands alone insufficient
  • Requirement: Deep doctrinal convergence to support multi-domain capability
Key Defence Concepts And Indian Context
Nuclear Deterrence
  • Core principle: Based on the threat of nuclear retaliation to prevent adversary aggression by ensuring unacceptable damage.
  • Credible minimum deterrence: Focuses on maintaining only the necessary nuclear capability to ensure effective retaliation.
  • No First Use doctrine with caveat: India follows NFU but reserves the right to use nuclear weapons in response to biological or chemical attacks, as stated in the 2003 doctrine.
  • Nuclear triad capability: India possesses land, air, and sea-based delivery systems, ensuring survivable deterrence.
  • Second-strike capability: Strengthened through Arihant-class SSBNs and Agni-V ICBM with MIRV under Mission Divyastra, ensuring assured retaliation.
Private Sector Participation in Defence
  • Structural transformation: Shift from government monopoly to inclusion of private sector in defence manufacturing and innovation.
  • Policy framework: Driven by the Aatmanirbhar Bharat initiative promoting self-reliance in defence production.
  • Institutional reform: Corporatisation of the Ordnance Factory Board into seven Defence Public Sector Undertakings (DPSUs).
  • Rising contribution: Private sector share reached about 22.56% (around 23%) in FY 2024–25, indicating growing industrial participation.
  • Major platform development: The Tata-Airbus C-295 project represents a landmark case of private-led defence manufacturing.
  • Clarification on Shaurya Squadrons: These refer to tactical drone units within Indian Army armoured regiments, not a private-sector system; however, drones used are often produced by private firms under initiatives like iDEX.
Cyber Warfare Capability
  • Operational domain: Encompasses defensive and offensive cyber operations targeting critical infrastructure and adversary systems.
  • Strategic evolution: India has moved beyond a defensive posture to incorporate offensive cyber capabilities.
  • Institutional framework: The Defence Cyber Agency (DCyA), established in 2019, coordinates tri-service cyber operations.
  • Operational integration: Command Cyber Operations and Support Wings (CCOSW) have been operationalised at command and corps levels to embed cyber tools into battlefield operations.
Space Warfare Capability
  • Strategic domain: Involves the use of space-based assets for intelligence, surveillance, navigation, and counter-space operations.
  • Doctrinal shift: India has transitioned from a civilian-focused space programme towards military preparedness in response to emerging threats.
  • Key milestone: Mission Shakti (2019) demonstrated India’s anti-satellite (ASAT) capability.
  • Institutional mechanism: The Defence Space Agency (DSA) was established to manage military space operations.
  • Satellite infrastructure expansion: Development of integrated satellite networks is aligned with Space-Based Surveillance (SBS) Phase III, including the I-STAR constellation of around 52 military satellites for real-time intelligence and deep surveillance.
  • Integrated network concept: Space-ground integration aims to provide seamless battlefield awareness and protect satellites from disruption or attack.

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