Daily Mains Answer Writing –28 January 2026

Model Answer

Introduction

The 74th Constitutional Amendment was intended to create politically accountable urban governments by devolving powers, functions, and responsibilities to elected municipalities. However, three decades later, the executive architecture of Indian cities continues to concentrate authority in state-appointed bureaucrats, leaving elected mayors with minimal control. This structural imbalance has weakened democratic accountability and diluted the constitutional vision of urban self-government.

Body

Constitutional promise and executive mismatch

• Intended design: Part IX-A and the Twelfth Schedule envisage municipalities as institutions of self-government responsible for core civic functions such as urban planning, water supply, and slum improvement.
• Operational reality: In most states, executive authority is vested in a Municipal Commissioner appointed under state municipal laws.

Mayor–Commissioner power asymmetry

• Electoral accountability: Mayors are politically accountable to urban voters but lack authority over budgets, personnel, or project execution.
• Administrative dominance: Commissioners control finances, contracts, and inter-departmental coordination without direct electoral scrutiny.

Breakdown of democratic feedback loop

• Authority without responsibility: Commissioners answer upward to the state government rather than downward to citizens.
• Responsibility without authority: Municipal councils cannot enforce decisions or discipline executive leadership.

Empirical evidence of accountability deficit

• CAG Audit (2024): Across 18 states, only 4 of the 18 Twelfth Schedule functions were fully devolved.
• Praja Urban Governance Index (2024): Kerala is the only state where mayors write the ACR of commissioners.

Conclusion

By separating administrative power from electoral accountability, the current executive structure has reduced urban democracy to a procedural formality. Realising the intent of the 74th Amendment requires aligning executive authority with elected leadership so that urban governance becomes responsive, answerable, and citizen-centred.

Model Answer

Introduction

Metropolitan governance in India is characterised by the coexistence of municipalities, parastatal agencies, and special-purpose entities exercising overlapping authority. While this structure was justified on grounds of technical efficiency, it has produced fragmented accountability and persistent failures in urban service delivery.

Body

Multiplicity of governing institutions

• Urban local bodies: Constitutionally mandated to deliver civic services under the Twelfth Schedule.
• Parastatal agencies: Development authorities, water boards, and transport bodies operate under state control.
• Special Purpose Vehicles: Project-specific corporate entities created under missions such as Smart Cities.

Fragmentation of authority and responsibility

• Functional overlap: Planning, transport, housing, and utilities are controlled by different agencies within the same urban space.
• Accountability dilution: Citizens cannot clearly identify which institution is responsible for service failures.

Erosion of municipal effectiveness

• Loss of core functions: High-revenue and strategic functions such as land use planning are retained by parastatals.
• Residual burdens: ULBs handle sanitation, slums, and solid waste without matching financial or administrative powers.

Service delivery failures

• Infrastructure neglect: Persistent hazards remain unaddressed due to inter-agency apathy.
• Illustrative case: The January 2026 Noida accident occurred despite repeated inspections since 2015, highlighting governance vacuum.

Planning and metropolitan coordination deficit

• Inactive MPCs: Constitutionally mandated Metropolitan Planning Committees remain largely defunct.
• Unplanned sprawl: Peri-urban areas grow without integrated transport, drainage, or water networks.

Audit and evidence base

• CAG findings: Incomplete transfer of functions has weakened coordination and service outcomes.
• Urban flooding examples: Bengaluru’s encroached rajakaluves reflect fragmented land-use control.

Conclusion

Institutional fragmentation has created a system where authority is dispersed but accountability is absent. Without consolidating functions under democratically accountable metropolitan institutions, urban governance will continue to produce coordination failures and service deficits, undermining the sustainability of India’s cities.

Model Answer

Introduction

Urban local bodies are expected to act as engines of economic growth and service delivery, yet their financial capacity remains severely constrained. Despite Finance Commission grants and multiple urban missions, fiscal dependence on higher governments has limited their ability to deliver and sustain essential urban services.

Body

Structural limits on revenue autonomy

• Constitutional gap: Unlike the Centre and States, ULBs lack a clearly defined revenue base in the Constitution.
• Weak own-source revenue: Property tax collection remains low due to outdated valuation systems and political resistance.

Dependence on inter-governmental transfers

• Grant-centric financing: ULBs rely heavily on state and central grants for both capital and operational expenditure.
• Conditional funding: Centrally Sponsored Schemes restrict local prioritisation and flexibility.

Macroeconomic evidence of fiscal weakness

• Stagnation: Municipal revenues and expenditures have remained around 1% of GDP for over a decade.
• Comparative deficit: This is significantly lower than peer emerging economies.

Impact on service quality

• Short-term planning: Cities prioritise scheme compliance over long-term infrastructure maintenance.
• Implementation gaps: AMRUT 2.0 projects face delays due to lack of technical and financial capacity.

Environmental and sustainability costs

• Waste management failure: Around 77% of urban waste is dumped untreated due to lack of processing infrastructure.
• Climate vulnerability: Underinvestment worsens flooding, water scarcity, and public health risks.

Conclusion

Fiscal dependence has reduced urban local bodies to passive implementers rather than autonomous governments. Sustainable urban service delivery requires predictable revenues, empowered local taxation, and financing mechanisms that allow cities to plan beyond scheme cycles and political timelines.