Daily Newspaper Notes: March 12, 2026

Passive Euthanasia And The Right To Die With Dignity

Constitutional Basis: Right to Die with Dignity

• The judgment builds on Common Cause vs Union of India (2018), where a Constitution Bench held that the right to live with dignity under Article 21 includes the right to die with dignity.
• The Court clarified that the Constitution does not recognise a right to death, but acknowledges the autonomy of individuals to refuse medical treatment that merely prolongs the dying process.
• Constitutional protection of life extends beyond biological survival and includes meaningful human existence grounded in autonomy and personhood.
• When medical intervention cannot restore awareness or agency, indefinite life-prolonging treatment may undermine dignity.

Active and Passive Euthanasia

• Active euthanasia involves deliberate administration of a substance intended to cause death and remains illegal in India.
• Passive euthanasia involves withdrawing or withholding medical intervention that artificially prolongs life and is legally permitted under specific judicial conditions.
• The distinction between the two is based on causation. Active euthanasia introduces a new cause of death, whereas passive euthanasia removes artificial medical barriers allowing the underlying illness to take its natural course.
• In Airedale NHS Trust vs Bland (1993), the House of Lords held that withdrawing life-sustaining treatment does not kill the patient; the disease remains the cause of death while the physician merely ceases intervention.

Clinically Assisted Nutrition as Medical Treatment

• The Supreme Court clarified that clinically assisted nutrition and hydration delivered through a PEG tube constitute medical treatment.
• A feeding tube requires surgical insertion and periodic hospital procedures, making it a clinical intervention rather than ordinary care.
• Therefore, continuation of such treatment must follow the same principles applicable to medical treatment, including patient autonomy, informed consent, and medical futility.

Evolution of Judicial Approach

• In Aruna Shanbaug vs Union of India (2011), the Supreme Court rejected euthanasia but allowed withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment under strict conditions, including approval of a High Court and consent of close relatives.
• The decision laid the foundation for Common Cause vs Union of India (2018), which recognised the legality of passive euthanasia and introduced the concept of living wills, allowing individuals to specify withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment if they become terminally ill.
• Hospitals and families found the procedure complex, leading the Court later to clarify the role of medical boards, whose evaluations became central to such decisions.
• The Harish Rana judgment (2026) relied on medical board opinions and overruled earlier interpretations that treated feeding tubes as non-medical interventions.

Institutional and Policy Concerns

• Despite repeated directions from the Supreme Court since 2018, Parliament has not enacted comprehensive legislation governing end-of-life care.
• Doctors often rely on “Discharge Against Medical Advice” forms due to uncertainty about implementing the legal framework for withdrawal of treatment.
• Palliative care remains severely underfunded, and doctors frequently lack training regarding the legal process for end-of-life decisions.
• Issues relating to proxy consent and legal protection for physicians acting in good faith remain unresolved.

Need for Legislative Framework

• The Supreme Court has repeatedly urged Parliament to enact legislation governing end-of-life care.
• Such legislation could establish procedures for implementing living wills.
• It could provide legal protection for doctors who withdraw treatment in accordance with established protocols.
• It could clarify decision-making authority when families disagree.
• It could integrate palliative care into public health policy.

Changes In FDI Policy For Land Border Countries (LBCs)

2020 FDI Policy Amendment

• The policy made government approval mandatory for investments from countries sharing a land border with India.
• The measure was aimed at preventing opportunistic acquisitions of Indian companies during the economic disruptions caused by the pandemic.
• The amendment was primarily directed at Chinese investments.

Recent Changes in Investment Guidelines

• Investors with non-controlling beneficial ownership from LBCs up to 10% will now be allowed under the automatic route.
• Proposals involving LBC investments in key manufacturing sectors, including capital goods and electronic components, will be processed and decided within 60 days.
• The policy allows flexibility in calibrating Chinese investments through joint ventures with Indian partners to strengthen domestic manufacturing capabilities.

Objectives of the Policy Changes

• Encourage greater foreign direct investment inflows.
• Improve access to new technologies.
• Facilitate integration with global supply chains.
• Support development of domestic manufacturing capabilities in strategic sectors.

Declining Capital Inflows

• Capital inflows to India fell to $18 billion in 2024–25.
• During April–December 2025, capital flows turned negative.
• These trends highlight the need to facilitate more foreign investments and adopt a comprehensive approach to trade and investment relations with China.

Policy Views on Chinese Investments

• The Economic Survey 2023–24 suggested that India could benefit from the China+1 strategy by integrating with Chinese supply chains or easing FDI from China.
• It noted that FDI from China could help boost India’s exports to the United States, similar to the experience of East Asian economies.
• A high-level committee chaired by NITI Aayog member Rajiv Gauba reportedly recommended removing restrictions on Chinese investments.

Trade Trends Between India and China

• Despite declining Chinese investments, bilateral trade has expanded.
• Imports from China increased from $70 billion in 2018–19 to $113.4 billion in 2024–25.
• This rise occurred despite India opting out of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP).

Policy Approach Towards China

• China remains central to global manufacturing, including intermediate goods, rare earths, technology, and technical expertise.
• India requires capital and technology to support its development trajectory.
• The policy approach must balance economic imperatives with strategic caution while remaining open to trade and investment.

Revision Of Earthquake Zoning Framework In India

Current Earthquake Zoning Framework

• India has traditionally relied on a fixed zoning model to classify earthquake risk across regions.
• This model assigns specific zones to areas based on expected seismic intensity.
• The framework guides building codes, infrastructure design, and disaster preparedness measures.
• Proposed Shift to Probabilistic Seismic Hazard Assessment (PSHA)
• The BIS proposed moving toward Probabilistic Seismic Hazard Assessment (PSHA).
• PSHA is a probability-based approach that models earthquake risk using simulations of ground motion.
• Many advanced economies and seismically active regions globally already use this framework.
• The shift aims to provide a more dynamic and scientifically grounded assessment of seismic hazards.

Key Features of the Proposed Revision

• The revised framework introduced a new highest-risk seismic category, Zone VI.
• Zone VI would cover most of Kashmir, parts of the Himalayan belt, Kutch in Gujarat, and regions in the North-East.
• The revised zoning was notified in November 2025 but withdrawn on March 3 following concerns from stakeholders.

Cost and Development Implications

• Increasing seismic risk classification would significantly raise construction and infrastructure costs.
• A one-zone increase in seismic classification could raise construction costs by about 20%.
• A two-zone increase could increase costs by nearly one-third.
• Major infrastructure projects such as metro rail systems, dams, and power stations could face even higher cost escalations.
• Urban planners fear stricter zoning could slow development in economically fragile regions.

Concerns About Informal Housing

• Stricter zoning requirements may increase construction costs for formal housing.
• This could push more housing activity into the informal sector, which already accounts for nearly 80% of India’s homes.

Institutional Concerns and Policy Pushback

• The proposed revisions faced opposition from both private sector stakeholders and government institutions.
• Concerns were raised by the Ministry of Housing and Urban Affairs, Ministry of Home Affairs, Central Water Commission, and the National Dam Safety Authority.

Climate and Sustainability Dimensions

• The construction sector is one of the largest dispersed sources of carbon emissions in India.
• Changes in building standards linked to seismic zoning may have implications for climate mitigation and infrastructure sustainability.

Need for a Holistic Zoning Framework

• Revising earthquake zoning remains necessary for improving disaster resilience.
• The process requires wider consultation among ministries, regulators, and industry stakeholders.
• A balanced framework must address seismic safety, affordability, climate concerns, and implementation challenges.

Women Workers In India’s Agricultural Economy

Challenges in Counting Women Workers

• Accurate data on women engaged in agriculture, livestock rearing, fisheries, and allied activities are lacking.
• Large-scale labour surveys such as the Periodic Labour Force Survey (PLFS) often fail to capture women’s work because it is:
  • Home-based or farm-based
  • Unpaid or seasonal
  • Intermittent and combined with care work
• Women frequently do not report themselves as workers when tasks such as child care and livestock rearing occur simultaneously.

Trends in Women’s Workforce Participation

• Women’s workforce participation in rural India has increased in recent years.
• Among rural women aged 15 years and above, participation rose from 35% in 2011–12 to 46.5% in 2023–24.
• This level remains below the global range of 57%–63% reported by the International Labour Organization.

Rise of Self-Employment

• The increase in participation is largely due to growth in self-employment rather than wage employment.
• The share of rural women workers classified as self-employed rose from 60% in 2011–12 to 73% in 2023–24.
• The share of women employed as regular or casual wage workers declined during this period.
• Within agriculture, the share of self-employed women increased from 48% to 62%.
• Women accounted for 47.2% of all self-employed workers in agriculture in 2023–24.

Women in Crop Production

• Gender-disaggregated data on family labour in crop cultivation are not available in official statistics.
• Village-level surveys from the PARI project of the Foundation for Agrarian Studies provide insights.
• In four studied villages in Tamil Nadu and Uttar Pradesh, women contributed about one-third of family labour in crop production.
• When family and hired labour were combined:
  • Women accounted for 61% of labour in Palakurichi and 57% in Venmani in Tamil Nadu.
  • Women accounted for about 41% in Mahatwar village of eastern Uttar Pradesh.
• The differences reflect variations in crop choice, farming systems, and socio-economic composition of households.
• Overall, crop cultivation relies heavily on women’s labour.

Women in Livestock Rearing

• Livestock rearing is one of the fastest-growing sectors within agriculture, with women forming the primary workforce.
• In family-based livestock rearing, particularly milch cattle and poultry, most tasks are performed by women.
• A woman typically spends around two hours per day per animal.
• According to the All India Debt and Investment Survey (2018–19), about 40 million rural households own milch animals, implying around 40 million women engaged in animal rearing.

Women in Agricultural Wage Labour

• Mechanisation and declining demand for labour in agriculture have reduced demand for women’s labour.
• In the studied villages, women’s share in casual labour employment in crop production ranged from 16% to 71%.
• In most cases, women constituted more than one-third of hired labour.
• Women wage workers came from manual labour households as well as poorer peasant households.

Wage Levels and Gender Gap

• In the surveyed villages, a woman agricultural worker earned less than ₹300 per day.
• In the Tamil Nadu villages, women’s wages (₹290) were less than 50% of male wages.
• In Uttar Pradesh villages, women earned ₹242–₹276 per day, with a narrower gender gap due to lower male wages.
• According to Labour Bureau data (November 2025), the average all-India daily wage for women in agricultural operations was ₹384.
• Wage levels varied across states, with Kerala recording the highest wage of ₹646 per day.
• Real wages for women workers have barely increased over the last decade after adjusting for inflation.

Land Ownership and Structural Issues

• Women constitute about half of the agricultural workforce in India.
• However, only 10% of rural women own land, which is the primary productive asset in agriculture.
• Women agricultural workers number 21.7 million, exceeding male workers (19.7 million) for the first time since Independence.

Overall Situation

• Women’s labour is central to crop cultivation, livestock rearing, and agricultural wage labour.
• Despite their significant role, wages remain low and gender disparities persist.
• Official statistics inadequately capture women’s participation in agriculture.
• There is a need for accurate recording of women workers and ensuring fair wages and worker rights.

Revision Of India’s GDP Series (Base Year 2022–23)

GDP and National Accounts Statistics

• Gross Domestic Product (GDP) represents the sum of the final value of all goods and services produced in an economy during a year, net of material inputs.
• It is the most widely used measure of a country’s economic size.
• GDP or Gross Value Added (GVA) is estimated using data on physical outputs and their prices, along with various statistical procedures.
• Estimates follow internationally standardised frameworks under the UNSNA.

Background: Issues with the 2011–12 Base-Year Series

• The previous revision, with 2011–12 as the base year, was released in 2015.
• Several analysts questioned the veracity of GDP estimates in that series.
• In sectors such as manufacturing, the reported growth rates were not only higher than earlier estimates but sometimes showed a different direction of change.
• The estimated size of the non-financial private corporate sector (PCS) was significantly larger than previously reported.
• Many experts argued that GDP growth rates during the last decade may have been overestimated.
• The International Monetary Fund (IMF) later assigned India a ‘C’ grade for the quality of its National Accounts Statistics.

Key Changes in the New GDP Series

• The revised estimates show the absolute size of GDP declining by about 3–4% compared with the earlier series.
• However, annual growth rates remain broadly similar, differing by around ±1 percentage point between the two series.
• The sectoral composition of GDP has changed slightly:
  • The share of agriculture and industry has increased.
  • The share of services has declined.

Changes in the Industrial Sector

• Within the industrial sector, the share of manufacturing in GDP increased marginally from 14.3% to 14.7%.
• However, the absolute size of the manufacturing sector declined by about 1.5–1.6% compared with the previous series.
• This change is significant because the manufacturing sector was central to earlier debates about GDP estimation.

Institutional Composition of GDP

• The share of the non-financial private corporate sector (PCS) declined from 35.4% in the earlier series to 33.9% in the new series for 2022–23.
• The decline is larger for 2023–24, with a gap of 3.4 percentage points.
• The household or informal sector’s share increased slightly, rising by:
  • 0.7 percentage points in 2022–23
  • 2.7 percentage points in 2023–24
• The rise in the household sector share is partly linked to agriculture.

Interpretation of the Revision

• In principle, rebasing the NAS should not alter the absolute GDP size at current prices, since the underlying economy remains the same.
• Revisions often increase GDP size due to improved data and better measurement of economic activities.
• Therefore, the decline in GDP size in the new series appears unexpected.
• The reduction may represent a correction to previously overestimated GDP figures.

Implications of the Revised Estimates

• A lower GDP size affects the assessment of the economy’s performance.
• It may delay the target of achieving a $5-trillion economy, announced in 2019.
• While the revision appears to address some earlier concerns, it remains unclear whether all methodological issues have been resolved.