Daily Newspaper Notes: March 2, 2026

• PRAHAAR marks doctrinal consolidation of counter-terror measures earlier developed through legislation and executive practice.
• Introduced against threats such as cross-border terrorism, hybrid warfare, encrypted communication, drone logistics, and crime-terror convergence.
• Recognises collusion between state and non-state actors and the blending of kinetic and non-kinetic methods.
• Addresses use of digital space for radicalisation and mobilisation of youth.
• Transforms counter-terrorism from ad hoc function to structured national security framework.
• Emphasises intelligence-led prevention and pre-emptive disruption.
• Strengthens real-time intelligence sharing through MAC and JTFI.
• Recognises hybrid threat matrix: dark web financing, crypto transactions, narcotics trafficking, drones, cyber intrusion, algorithm-driven radicalisation.
• Integrates central and state agencies, law enforcement, intelligence, and international partnerships.

• Prevention
• Response
• Aggregation of capacities
• Human rights and rule of law
• Attenuation of radicalisation
• Aligning international alignment
• Recovery through whole-of-society approach

• Anchored in UAPA (1967), PMLA (2002), and new criminal codes.
• Supported by high conviction rates; NIA conviction rate around 92% (2025 report).
• Emphasises due process, judicial oversight, Protection of Human Rights Act, ICCPR, ICESCR.
• Focuses on de-radicalisation and socio-psychological prevention.
• Involves community leaders, NGOs, religious scholars, youth initiatives.

• Utilises extradition treaties, MLATs, joint working groups, UN engagement.
• Positions India within global counter-terror diplomacy.

• Incorporates public-private partnerships and community reintegration.
• Recognises importance of post-terror recovery alongside prevention.

• Hybrid threats include drones, cyberattacks, dark web financing, information warfare.
• Narco-terror link acknowledged but lacks specialised strategy.
• References drug trafficking hubs: Golden Crescent and Golden Triangle.
• Drug seizures in Punjab and Northeast indicate cross-border linkages (Pakistan, Myanmar, Laos).
• Policy addresses crypto wallets and dark web but lacks clear operational roadmap for blockchain tracking and global coordination.
• Hawala systems not specifically addressed.
• Mentions online radicalisation but lacks clarity on algorithmic amplification and tech company engagement.
• Limited focus on encrypted messaging, online gaming platforms, digital echo chambers.
• Online Gaming Act 2025 implemented; gaming domain remains under-regulated.
• Recognises state-sponsored terrorism but lacks defined deterrence thresholds.
• No clear articulation of cross-border retaliation strategy despite “zero tolerance” approach post–Operation Sindoor.
• Identified gaps: narco-terror disruption framework, AI-enabled detection systems, private-sector cyber governance, explicit cyber-domain doctrine.
• Effectiveness depends on operational agility, technological innovation, and political will.
• Potential need for integrated deterrence framework against collusive state and non-state actors.

Recent US testimony (February 2026) highlighted the expectation that India will play a greater security role in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) amid China’s expanding presence. The issue centres on China–India strategic contestation and India’s response through partnerships and regional engagement.

Institutionalising India–Australia Cooperation in the Indian Ocean Region, ORF

• US Strategic Signalling
  • US views a strong and independent India as vital to prevent regional dominance by a single power (China).
  • Signals expectation that India will assume greater responsibility in IOR security.
  • Like-minded countries see India as a key balancer in sustaining a rules-based order.
• China’s Expanding Footprint in the IOR
  • China has expanded its economic and security presence via the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).
  • Infrastructure investments in ports, energy and transport backed by large loans.
  • Increased debt burdens have created structural dependencies in some countries.
  • Example: Sri Lanka leased Hambantota port to China for 99 years (2017).
  • Chinese engagement includes port access, surveillance activity and defence cooperation.
  • Strategic objectives include securing supply chains, accessing sea lanes and constraining India’s regional influence.
  • Around 80% of China’s energy imports transit the IOR.
• Implications for India
  • India views the IOR as its traditional sphere of influence and first line of defence.
  • Concerned about normalisation of Chinese military access in its maritime neighbourhood.
  • Risk of constrained crisis response options due to expanded Chinese presence.
• India’s Regional Response
  • Focus on geo-economics, connectivity and development partnerships.
  • Undertaken over 100 connectivity projects across the region.
  • Challenges:
    • Politicisation of India’s role in neighbouring states.
    • Financial and implementation capacities lag behind China.
• Strategic Partnerships
  • India collaborating with like-minded partners to strengthen regional presence.
  • Partnerships help:
    • Improve implementation capacity.
    • Reduce politicisation risks.
    • Counterbalance China’s influence.
  • Cooperation spans connectivity, port development and regional infrastructure initiatives.
• India–Australia Dimension (India-Centric Relevance)
  • Australia identifies India as a ‘top-tier partner’.
  • Both share concerns over supply chains and maritime security.
  • Co-chair Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA) maritime security subgroup.
  • Scope for deeper defence cooperation and joint Indian Ocean security planning.
  • Emphasis on preventing coercive control of chokepoints and infrastructure in the IOR.

• US testimony date: 11 February 2026.
• Hambantota port lease to China: 99 years (2017).
• China’s energy imports: ~80% transit the IOR.
• India has undertaken 100+ connectivity projects in the region.
• IOR increasingly central to India’s strategic and maritime security calculus.

India has been the world’s largest rice exporter since 2011-12 and became the top producer in 2024-25. The key challenge is sustaining this leadership in environmentally and financially sustainable ways.

Why India’s rice production and exports requires a rethink, The Indian Express

• India’s Global Position
  • 2024-25 exports: 21.69 million tonnes (mt), highest globally.
  • 2024-25 production: 150 mt, surpassing China.
  • Sustainability concerns: high water use and low-value exports in non-basmati rice.
• Environmental Dimension
  • Paddy cultivation is highly water-intensive.
  • Conventional cultivation consumes ~5 million litres per acre.
  • Approximate water footprint: 3,000 litres per kg of rice.
  • Exporting rice indirectly exports large quantities of water.
• Financial Dimension
  • Basmati exports (5–6 mt) generate export value comparable to higher-volume non-basmati exports (11–14 mt).
  • Average price realisation:
    • Basmati: Rs 82.9–92.3/kg.
    • Non-basmati: Rs 34–39.2/kg.
  • Basmati provides higher value per kg and per litre of water used.
• Strategic Shift Suggested
  • Increase basmati exports.
  • Promote high-value, aromatic GI-protected varieties.
  • Expand basmati cultivation within the 6.2 million hectare GI region (current area ~2.1 mh).
  • Consider floor price mechanism for basmati.
  • Shift from commodity rice to high-value, less water-intensive exports.
• Breeding and Technological Measures
  • Development of high-yield, short-duration basmati varieties (e.g., Pusa Basmati-1509).
  • Release of disease-resistant basmati varieties (2021) through marker-assisted selection.
  • Reduced need for chemical sprays enhances export value.
  • Adoption of predictive breeding using genomic selection and machine learning to speed up varietal development.

• Water footprint: ~3,000 litres per kg of rice.
• Basmati exports: $5.8–5.9 billion (recent years).
• GI basmati area: 6.2 mh; current cultivation ~2.1 mh.
• Pusa Basmati-1509 maturity: 115–120 days.

Escalating conflict involving Iran, the US and Israel has disrupted oil and gas flows through the Strait of Hormuz, a key global energy chokepoint. The disruption has implications for India, which depends heavily on the route for oil and gas imports.

Strait of Hormuz oil flows dry up: How this affects India, and the options ahead, The Indian Express

• Strategic Importance of the Strait
  • Connects the Persian Gulf with the Arabian Sea.
  • Handles ~20% of global liquid petroleum consumption and LNG trade.
  • ~15 million barrels of crude pass daily.
  • Even with alternative pipelines, ~9% of global demand remains at risk if closed.
• India’s Energy Exposure
  • Around 50% of India’s oil imports (2.5–2.7 million bpd) pass through the Strait.
  • India is the world’s third-largest crude consumer.
  • Import dependence: over 88% for crude oil.
  • ~60% of LNG imports transit the Strait.
  • 80–85% of LPG demand met through imports, mostly via Hormuz.
  • LPG and LNG lack structural strategic reserves unlike crude.
• Near-Term Mitigation Options
  • Indian refiners hold over 10 days of crude inventories plus about a week of fuel stocks.
  • Strategic petroleum reserves can be utilised.
  • Diversification options: Russia, US, West Africa, Latin America.
  • Russian cargoes available in Indian Ocean and Arabian Sea region.
  • Flexibility to pivot sourcing reduces risk of prolonged crude supply crisis.
• Vulnerability Areas
  • LPG is the “bigger vulnerability” due to high import dependence and lack of buffers.
  • LNG imports also structurally exposed.
  • Spot cargo availability for LPG and LNG is limited.
  • Prolonged disruption could significantly strain LPG and LNG supplies.
• Price Impact
  • Brent crude rose from above $72 per barrel to over $82 before moderating.
  • At $77.5 per barrel, up 6.5% in early trade.
  • Every $1 per barrel increase raises India’s annual oil import bill by $1.8–2 billion.
  • In prolonged disruption scenarios, prices could exceed $100 per barrel.
• Likely Duration
  • No official confirmation of full blockade by Iran.
  • Disruptions largely precautionary due to security risks.
  • Experts believe any closure would likely be temporary (one to two weeks).
  • Even short disruptions may cause tanker congestion and prolonged logistical delays.
  • Prolonged blockade unlikely due to geopolitical consequences and dependence of Gulf states, including Iran, on energy export revenues.

• ~15 million barrels/day transit Hormuz.
• ~50% of India’s oil imports pass through the Strait.
• Crude import dependency: >88%.
• LPG import dependence: 80–85%.
• ~60% of LNG imports transit Hormuz.
• $1 increase in oil price → $1.8–2 billion rise in annual import bill.

The Sixteenth Finance Commission (FC) determined the vertical and horizontal distribution of central tax revenues among States. Its approach has raised concerns regarding fiscal space, devolution design, and equalisation objectives.

Sixteenth Finance Commission-misses and concerns, The Hindu

• Vertical Devolution
  • Retained States’ share in divisible pool at 41%, continuing the level set after the Fourteenth FC (revised from 42% due to J&K reorganisation).
  • Noted Centre’s concern over reduced fiscal space.
  • Centre’s response to higher devolution earlier:
    • Increased non-shareable cesses and surcharges.
    • Reduced contribution to centrally sponsored schemes.
    • Did not accept certain grants recommended by the Fifteenth FC.
  • Sixteenth FC made no recommendation to limit cesses and surcharges, despite their temporary and specific-purpose nature.
  • Proposed a “grand bargain”:
    • States accept smaller share of a larger divisible pool.
    • Centre merges major cesses/surcharges into regular taxes.
  • Discontinued revenue deficit grants.
  • Did not recommend State-specific or sector-specific grants.
  • Result: Effective transfer ratio projected at 32.7% (2026-27), lower than Fifteenth FC period (34.4%).
  • Did not factor:
    • Revenue impact of September 2025 GST reforms.
    • Lower nominal GDP growth assumption (Budget: 10%; FC: 11%).
• Horizontal Devolution
  • Introduced new “contribution” criterion reflecting efficiency.
  • Measured using State’s share in all-State GSDP.
  • Conceptual issue:
    • GSDP reflects production factors and market concentration, not fiscal efficiency.
  • GSDP used in opposite directions:
    • Income distance: lower per capita GSDP → higher share.
    • Contribution: higher per capita GSDP → higher share.
  • Finally used square root of GSDP to moderate effects.
  • Dropped tax effort/fiscal discipline criterion.
  • Changes in weights of other criteria described as judgement-based.
• Impact on States
  • States losing compared to Fifteenth FC:
    • Madhya Pradesh
    • Uttar Pradesh
    • West Bengal
    • Bihar
    • Odisha
    • Chhattisgarh
    • Rajasthan
    • Several north-eastern and small States (Arunachal Pradesh, Meghalaya, Manipur, Nagaland, Tripura, Sikkim, Goa)
  • Gains to richer States not uniform.
• Equalisation Concerns
  • Devolution alone insufficient to address cost and need differentials.
  • Revenue gap/equalisation grants could have mitigated losses.
  • Article 275 provides for State-specific “needs”-based transfers.
  • Equalisation grants relevant for health and education standards.
  • Commission dropped revenue deficit grants instead of refining them.
  • While ad hoc grants may be inappropriate, norm-based equalisation grants remain important.

• States’ share retained at 41%.
• Effective transfer ratio:
  • Fourteenth FC: 35.6%
  • Fifteenth FC: 34.4%
  • Sixteenth FC (2026-27 BE): 32.7%
• No curbs recommended on cesses and surcharges.
• Revenue deficit and State-specific grants discontinued.
• New contribution criterion based on (square root of) GSDP.