1. A member may attract disqualification proceedings not only by formally joining another party but also by defying the party whip.
2. Once a disqualification petition is filed, judicial review can ordinarily be invoked before the presiding officer gives a ruling, if there is delay.
3. The absence of a fixed time limit in the Tenth Schedule may allow a member facing disqualification to continue as a member until the presiding officer decides the petition.
Which of the statements given above is/are correct?
Statement-wise Analysis
Statement 1 – Correct: The Tenth Schedule covers disqualification not only for formally joining another political party but also for voting or abstaining from voting contrary to the party’s direction, commonly called the party whip, without prior permission. Further, “voluntarily giving up membership” is wider than formal resignation; it can be inferred from the conduct of the member. Therefore, both open defiance of party direction inside the House and conduct showing abandonment of party loyalty may attract disqualification proceedings.
Statement 2 – Incorrect: Judicial review of the Speaker’s or Chairman’s decision is generally available only after the presiding officer has given a ruling. In Kihoto Hollohan v. Zachillhu, the Supreme Court upheld judicial review but discouraged intervention at an intermediate stage before the decision. Delay by the presiding officer may allow courts to direct an early decision, as indicated in later cases such as Keisham Meghachandra Singh, but courts do not ordinarily review the merits of disqualification before the Speaker or Chairman has decided the petition.
Statement 3 – Correct: The Tenth Schedule does not prescribe a fixed time limit for deciding disqualification petitions. This creates a practical loophole because a member facing disqualification may continue to sit, vote, and function as a legislator until the presiding officer decides the petition. The Supreme Court has suggested that such petitions should normally be decided within a reasonable period, generally around three months, but this is not a statutory time limit written into the Tenth Schedule.
1. The 52nd Constitutional Amendment Act, 1985 inserted the Tenth Schedule into the Constitution.
2. The original Tenth Schedule recognised a split by one-third of the members of a party in a House as legitimate.
3. The 91st Constitutional Amendment Act, 2003 retained the one-third split exception but added a separate two-thirds requirement for ministerial appointments.
4. Under the post-91st Amendment framework, shifting members below two-thirds of that party’s strength in the House may face disqualification proceedings.
Which of the statements given above are correct?
Statement-wise Analysis
Statement 1 – Correct: The Tenth Schedule was inserted into the Constitution by the 52nd Constitutional Amendment Act, 1985. It created the constitutional framework for disqualifying legislators on the ground of defection and is commonly known as the anti-defection law.
Statement 2 – Correct: The original Tenth Schedule recognised a split by one-third of the members of a legislature party as an exception to disqualification. This meant that if at least one-third of the members broke away, they could claim protection from disqualification. This provision was later criticised because it encouraged engineered group defections.
Statement 3 – Incorrect: The 91st Constitutional Amendment Act, 2003 did not retain the one-third split exception. It deleted the split provision from the Tenth Schedule and made the anti-defection framework stricter. The 91st Amendment also introduced limits on the size of the Council of Ministers and restricted defectors from being appointed as ministers, but it did not create a separate two-thirds rule for ministerial appointments.
Statement 4 – Correct: Under the post-91st Amendment framework, the split defence is no longer available. The only major group-based protection is the merger exception, which requires at least two-thirds of the members of the legislature party to agree to the merger. If the number of shifting members is below two-thirds, they cannot claim the merger defence and may face disqualification proceedings under the Tenth Schedule.
Fact-wise Analysis
Option (a) – Incorrect: The anti-defection framework does not generally protect legislators merely because their vote against the party whip is based on constituency concerns. Defying the party whip itself can attract disqualification proceedings.
Option (b) – Correct: The anti-defection law was enacted to address large-scale defections and prevent horse-trading. However, a major criticism is that it binds legislators closely to the party line, reducing their agency as representatives of their constituency or State and increasing centralisation within political parties.
Option (c) – Incorrect: Judicial review generally follows the presiding officer’s ruling. Since the Tenth Schedule does not prescribe a fixed decision-making time limit, delay by the presiding officer may postpone judicial scrutiny.
Option (d) – Incorrect: A dissenting group in the legislature party is not automatically protected. The source distinguishes between ordinary defection, whip violation, and a valid merger defence requiring at least two-thirds of the members of a party in that House to switch over.
Statement I: Even if energy prices ease and trade with West Asia normalises, the rupee may not automatically stabilise if capital outflows are driven by weak confidence in India’s growth prospects.
Statement II: Foreign capital outflows usually support the rupee because they increase the supply of dollars in the domestic market.
Which one of the following is correct in respect of the above statements?
Statement-wise Analysis
Statement I – Correct: The rupee is influenced not only by current account factors such as oil prices, energy imports and trade disruptions, but also by capital account factors such as foreign portfolio investment, foreign direct investment, investor sentiment and confidence in India’s growth prospects. Even if energy prices ease and trade with West Asia normalises, the rupee may not automatically stabilise if foreign investors continue to sell Indian assets due to weak confidence in India’s growth outlook or macroeconomic stability. In such a situation, capital outflows can keep pressure on the rupee despite some improvement in the trade side.
Statement II – Incorrect: Foreign capital outflows do not support the rupee. When foreign investors exit Indian markets, they usually sell Indian assets, receive rupees, and then convert those rupees into dollars to take money out of India. This increases demand for dollars and increases the supply of rupees in the foreign exchange market. As a result, the dollar becomes costlier relative to the rupee, leading to rupee depreciation. It is foreign capital inflows, not outflows, that increase dollar supply in the domestic market and generally support the rupee.
Economic factor: Likely effect or channel
1. Higher crude oil prices: Increase dollar demand and worsen India’s external balance
2. Offshore NDF activity: Transmit exchange-rate expectations and volatility without physical delivery of rupees
3. Foreign portfolio investor selling: Weaken the rupee and weigh on broader market sentiment
4. Stronger Dollar Index: Put pressure on emerging-market currencies during risk-averse conditions
How many of the above pairs are correctly matched?
Fact-wise Analysis
Pair 1 – Correct: Higher crude oil prices worsen India’s external balance because India depends heavily on imported oil. They also raise demand for dollars, adding pressure on the rupee.
Pair 2 – Correct: The offshore Non-Deliverable Forward market is a rupee derivatives market settled without physical delivery of rupees. The source treats it as a channel affecting exchange-rate expectations and volatility.
Pair 3 – Correct: Foreign portfolio investor selling was a major pressure point in 2026. Such outflows weaken the rupee by increasing dollar demand and also affect equities and broader market sentiment.
Pair 4 – Correct: A stronger Dollar Index tends to pressure emerging-market currencies because investors move towards dollar assets during periods of uncertainty and risk aversion.
Fact-wise Analysis
Option (a) – Incorrect: The Outer Space Treaty, 1967 is clear that outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, cannot be subjected to national appropriation by claim of sovereignty, use, occupation or any other means. Therefore, whether the Moon can be treated as national territory is not the central ambiguity; the treaty clearly says it cannot.
Option (b) – Incorrect: The core ambiguity discussed in lunar governance is not about military bases. The Outer Space Treaty specifically restricts military use of celestial bodies and prohibits military bases, installations, fortifications and weapons testing on the Moon. The present debate is mainly about commercial extraction, ownership and control over lunar resources such as water ice and minerals.
Option (c) – Correct: The main legal ambiguity is whether extracted lunar resources can be owned even though the Moon itself cannot be claimed as sovereign territory. Article II prohibits appropriation of the Moon as territory, while Article I allows free exploration and use of outer space. This creates a contested space between “use” and “ownership”: one view treats resource extraction as a lawful use of space, while another sees private or national ownership of extracted resources as indirect appropriation of the Moon.
Option (d) – Incorrect: The Outer Space Treaty does not require all lunar exploration to be supervised by the United Nations. States remain internationally responsible for their national space activities, including those carried out by private entities, and must authorise and continuously supervise such activities. The Moon Agreement later proposed a stronger international regime for lunar resources, but it has not been accepted by most major space-faring powers.
Fact-wise Analysis
Option (a) – Incorrect: Treating the Moon and its resources as the Common Heritage of Mankind reflects the approach of the Moon Agreement, 1979. This principle is meant to prevent unilateral or exclusive control over lunar resources and emphasise collective benefit-sharing. It does not enable effective control by one State or group of actors.
Option (b) – Incorrect: An international regime to supervise lunar resource extraction would create collective oversight over resource use. This is closer to the Moon Agreement model, where extraction would be regulated through a multilateral framework. Such a regime would limit unilateral control rather than enable it.
Option (c) – Incorrect: A global treaty-based process through the United Nations would represent formal multilateral law-making. It would require broader international consent and would not by itself enable one actor to gain control over a specific lunar resource site. The concern in present lunar governance is that norms may instead emerge through coalition-based arrangements outside universal treaty-making.
Option (d) – Correct: Safety Zones are formally justified as operational areas meant to prevent harmful interference around lunar bases, rovers, scientific equipment or mining infrastructure. However, if such zones are created around scarce and strategically valuable water-ice deposits, especially near the lunar south pole, they may function as de facto exclusion zones. This can allow an actor to control access to a resource-rich site without formally claiming sovereignty over lunar territory, thereby staying within the language of the Outer Space Treaty while raising concerns about its spirit.